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Summa Contra Gentiles, First Book (On God)

The Summa Contra Gentiles was composed by Thomas Aquinas between 1259 and 1265, in four books broadly covering teachings on God, on Creation, on Providence, and on tenets specific to Christianity. This Summa is not to be confused with his final Summa, the Summa Theologiae. The latter is specifically "theological" and directed to a Christian audience (hence Summa "Theologica"), whereas the former, as the "Contra Gentiles" indicates, is directed toward "non-Christian" thinkers. Implicitly a defence of the Catholic Christian faith, the first three books constitute a sort of rational apology of Christian thought, where philosophical arguments are deployed to defend Christian beliefs and usually only evoke Scripture in a latter instance to show its concordance with these largely-rational conclusions; the fourth book, however, is theological in character given that its content deals primarily with topics derived from Christian revelation. Although Thomas Aquinas certainly aims to discredit pagan, Jewish, Muslim or Christian-"heretical" positions incompatible with the Catholic Christian religion in this work, at the same time he incorporates whatever is salvageable from their thought, thus often quoting in his favor the very authors he discredits on other positions: therefore the "Contra Gentiles" of this Summa is not to be understood as an outright rejection of non-Christian thought, but rather as a sort of "rational purification" unto its Catholic assimilation, in disposing open minds to revealed Christian truths. (Summary by M.S.C. Lambert, LC) (9 hr 28 min)

Chapters

I. IN WHAT CONSISTS THE OFFICE OF A WISE MAN (preceded by Translator's Preface)

II. THE AUTHOR'S INTENTION IN THIS WORK

III. IN WHAT WAY IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE KNOWN THE DIVINE TRUTH

IV. THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT DIVINE THINGS WHICH IS ATTAINABLE BY REASON IS FITTING…

V. THAT THOSE THINGS WHICH CANNOT BE INVESTIGATED REASON ARE FITTINGLY PROPOSED…

VI. THAT IT IS NOT A MARK OF LEVITY TO ASSENT TO THE THINGS THAT ARE OF FAITH, …

VII. THAT THE TRUTH OF REASON IS NOT IN OPPOSITION TO THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIA…

VIII. IN WHAT RELATION HUMAN REASON STANDS TO THE TRUTH OF FAITH

IX. OF THE ORDER AND MODE OF PROCEDURE IN THIS WORK

X. OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO AVER THAT IT CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE I…

XI. REFUTATION OF THE FOREGOING OPINION AND SOLUTION OF THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS

XII. OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CANNOT BE PROVED…

XIII. ARGUMENTS IN PROOF OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

XIV. THAT IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IT IS NECESSARY TO PROCEED BY TH…

XV. THAT GOD IS ETERNAL

XVI. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO PASSIVE POTENTIALITY

XVII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO MATTER

XVIII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO COMPOSITION

XIX. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NOTHING VIOLENT OR BESIDE NATURE

XX. THAT GOD IS NOT A BODY

XXI. THAT GOD IS HIS OWN ESSENCE

XXII. THAT IN GOD EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE ARE THE SAME

XXIII. THAT THERE IS NO ACCIDENT IN GOD

XXIV. THAT THE DIVINE BEING CANNOT BE SPECIFIED BY THE ADDITION OF ANY SUBSTANT…

XXV. THAT GOD IS NOT IN ANY GENUS

XXVI. THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORMAL BEING OF ALL THINGS

XXVII. THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORM OF A BODY

XXVIII. OF THE DIVINE PERFECTION

XXIX. OF THE LIKENESS OF CREATURES

XXX. WHAT TERMS CAN BE PREDICATED OF GOD

XXXI. THAT THE DIVINE PERFECTION AND THE PLURALITY OF DIVINE NAMES ARE NOT INCO…

XXXII. THAT NOTHING IS PREDICATED UNIVOCALLY OF GOD AND OTHER THINGS

XXXIII. THAT NOT ALL TERMS APPLIED TO GOD AND CREATURES ARE PURELY EQUIVOCAL

XXXIV. THAT TERMS APPLIED TO GOD AND CREATURES ARE EMPLOYED ANALOGICALLY

XXXV. THAT THE SEVERAL NAMES PREDICATED OF GOD ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS

XXXVI. HOW OUR INTELLECT FORMS A PROPOSITION ABOUT GOD

XXXVII. THAT GOD IS GOOD

XXXVIII. THAT GOD IS GOODNESS ITSELF

XXXIX. THAT NO EVIL CAN BE IN GOD

XL. THAT GOD IS THE GOOD OF EVERY GOOD

XLI. THAT GOD IS THE SOVEREIGN GOOD

XLII. THAT GOD IS ONE

XLIII. THAT GOD IS INFINITE

XLIV. THAT GOD IS AN INTELLIGENT BEING

XLV. THAT GOD'S ACT OF INTELLIGENCE IS HIS ESSENCE

XLVI. THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS BY NOTHING ELSE THAN HIS ESSENCE

XLVII. THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF PERFECTLY

XLVIII. THAT GOD KNOWS ONLY HIMSELF FIRST AND PER SE

XLIX. THAT GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF

L. THAT GOD HAS PROPER KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS

LI. REASONS FOR INQUIRING HOW THERE IS A MULTITUDE OF THINGS UNDERSTOOD IN THE …

LII. REASONS FOR INQUIRING HOW THERE IS A MULTITUDE OF THINGS UNDERSTOOD IN THE…

LIII. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING DOUBT

LIV. HOW THE DIVINE ESSENCE, THOUGH ONE AND SIMPLE, IS A PROPER LIKENESS OF ALL…

LV. THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS ALL THINGS AT THE SAME INSTANT

LVI. THAT GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT A HABIT

LVII. THAT GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT DISCURSIVE

LVIII. THAT GOD DOES NOT UNDERSTAND BY COMPOSITION AND DIVISION

LIX. THAT GOD IS NOT IGNORANT OF THE TRUTH OF ENUNCIATIONS

LX. THAT GOD IS TRUTH

LXI. THAT GOD IS THE MOST PURE TRUTH

LXII. THAT THE DIVINE TRUTH IS THE FIRST AND SUPREME TRUTH

LXIII. THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD DENY TO GOD THE KNOWLEDGE OF SINGULARS

LXIV. ORDER OF THE THINGS TO BE SAID ABOUT THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE

LXV. THAT GOD KNOWS SINGULARS

LXVI. THAT GOD KNOWS THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT

LXVII. THAT GOD KNOWS FUTURE CONTINGENT SINGULARS

LXVIII. THAT GOD KNOWS THE MOVEMENTS OF THE WILL

LXIX. THAT GOD KNOWS INFINITE THINGS

LXX. THAT GOD KNOWS TRIVIAL THINGS

LXXI. THAT GOD KNOWS EVIL THINGS

LXXII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS WILL

LXXIII. THAT GOD'S WILL IS HIS ESSENCE

LXXIV. THAT THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF GOD'S WILL IS THE DIVINE ESSENCE

LXXV. THAT GOD IN WILLING HIMSELF WILLS ALSO OTHER THINGS

LXXVI. THAT GOD, BY THE ONE ACT OF HIS WILL, WILLS HIMSELF AND OTHER THINGS

LXXVII. THAT THE MULTITUDE OF THINGS WILLED IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE DIVINE…

LXXVIII. THAT THE DIVINE WILL EXTENDS TO PARTICULAR GOODS

LXXIX. THAT GOD WILLS EVEN THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT YET

LXXX. THAT GOD NECESSARILY WILLS HIS BEING AND HIS GOODNESS

LXXXI. THAT GOD DOES NOT NECESSARILY WILL OTHER THINGS THAN HIMSELF

LXXXII. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE STATEMENT THAT GOD WILLS NOT OF NECESSITY THINGS…

LXXXIII. THAT GOD WILLS SOMETHING OTHER THAN HIMSELF BY A NECESSITY OF SUPPOSIT…

LXXXIV. THAT GOD'S WILL IS NOT OF THINGS IMPOSSIBLE IN THEMSELVES

LXXXV. THAT THE DIVINE WILL DOES NOT REMOVE CONTINGENCY FROM THINGS, NOR IMPOSE…

LXXXVI. THAT A REASON OF THE DIVINE WILL CAN BE ASSIGNED

LXXXVII. THAT NOTHING CAN BE THE CAUSE OF THE DIVINE WILL

LXXXVIII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS FREE-WILL

LXXXIX. THAT THE PASSIONS OF THE APPETITE ARE NOT IN GOD

XC. THAT IN GOD ARE DELIGHT AND JOY, NOR ARE THEY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE DIVINE …

XCI. THAT IN GOD THERE IS LOVE

XCII. HOW VIRTUES ARE TO BE ASCRIBED TO GOD

XCIII. THAT IN GOD THERE ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES WHICH ARE ABOUT ACTIONS

XCIV. THAT THE CONTEMPLATIVE VIRTUES ARE IN GOD

XCV. THAT GOD CANNOT WILL EVIL

XCVI. THAT GOD HATES NOTHING, NOR CAN THE HATRED OF ANYTHING BE ASCRIBED TO HIM

XCVII. THAT GOD IS A LIVING BEING

XCVIII. THAT GOD IS HIS OWN LIFE

XCIX. THAT GOD'S LIFE IS ETERNAL

C. THAT GOD IS HAPPY

CI. THAT GOD IS HIS OWN HAPPINESS

CII. THAT GOD'S HAPPINESS IS PERFECT AND SINGULAR, SURPASSING ALL OTHER HAPPINE…