Summa Contra Gentiles, First Book (On God)


The Summa Contra Gentiles was composed by Thomas Aquinas between 1259 and 1265, in four books broadly covering teachings on God, on Creation, on Providence, and on tenets specific to Christianity. This Summa is not to be confused with his final Summa, the Summa Theologiae. The latter is specifically "theological" and directed to a Christian audience (hence Summa "Theologica"), whereas the former, as the "Contra Gentiles" indicates, is directed toward "non-Christian" thinkers. Implicitly a defence of the Catholic Christian faith, the first three books constitute a sort of rational apology of Christian thought, where philosophical arguments are deployed to defend Christian beliefs and usually only evoke Scripture in a latter instance to show its concordance with these largely-rational conclusions; the fourth book, however, is theological in character given that its content deals primarily with topics derived from Christian revelation. Although Thomas Aquinas certainly aims to discredit pagan, Jewish, Muslim or Christian-"heretical" positions incompatible with the Catholic Christian religion in this work, at the same time he incorporates whatever is salvageable from their thought, thus often quoting in his favor the very authors he discredits on other positions: therefore the "Contra Gentiles" of this Summa is not to be understood as an outright rejection of non-Christian thought, but rather as a sort of "rational purification" unto its Catholic assimilation, in disposing open minds to revealed Christian truths. (Summary by M.S.C. Lambert, LC) (9 hr 28 min)

Chapters

I. IN WHAT CONSISTS THE OFFICE OF A WISE MAN (preceded by Translator's Preface)
II. THE AUTHOR'S INTENTION IN THIS WORK
III. IN WHAT WAY IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE KNOWN THE DIVINE TRUTH
IV. THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT DIVINE THINGS WHICH IS ATTAINABLE BY REASON IS FITTING…
V. THAT THOSE THINGS WHICH CANNOT BE INVESTIGATED REASON ARE FITTINGLY PROPOSED…
VI. THAT IT IS NOT A MARK OF LEVITY TO ASSENT TO THE THINGS THAT ARE OF FAITH, …
VII. THAT THE TRUTH OF REASON IS NOT IN OPPOSITION TO THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIA…
VIII. IN WHAT RELATION HUMAN REASON STANDS TO THE TRUTH OF FAITH
IX. OF THE ORDER AND MODE OF PROCEDURE IN THIS WORK
X. OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO AVER THAT IT CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE I…
XI. REFUTATION OF THE FOREGOING OPINION AND SOLUTION OF THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS
XII. OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CANNOT BE PROVED…
XIII. ARGUMENTS IN PROOF OF GOD'S EXISTENCE
XIV. THAT IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IT IS NECESSARY TO PROCEED BY TH…
XV. THAT GOD IS ETERNAL
XVI. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO PASSIVE POTENTIALITY
XVII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO MATTER
XVIII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO COMPOSITION
XIX. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NOTHING VIOLENT OR BESIDE NATURE
XX. THAT GOD IS NOT A BODY
XXI. THAT GOD IS HIS OWN ESSENCE
XXII. THAT IN GOD EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE ARE THE SAME
XXIII. THAT THERE IS NO ACCIDENT IN GOD
XXIV. THAT THE DIVINE BEING CANNOT BE SPECIFIED BY THE ADDITION OF ANY SUBSTANT…
XXV. THAT GOD IS NOT IN ANY GENUS
XXVI. THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORMAL BEING OF ALL THINGS
XXVII. THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORM OF A BODY
XXVIII. OF THE DIVINE PERFECTION
XXIX. OF THE LIKENESS OF CREATURES
XXX. WHAT TERMS CAN BE PREDICATED OF GOD
XXXI. THAT THE DIVINE PERFECTION AND THE PLURALITY OF DIVINE NAMES ARE NOT INCO…
XXXII. THAT NOTHING IS PREDICATED UNIVOCALLY OF GOD AND OTHER THINGS
XXXIII. THAT NOT ALL TERMS APPLIED TO GOD AND CREATURES ARE PURELY EQUIVOCAL
XXXIV. THAT TERMS APPLIED TO GOD AND CREATURES ARE EMPLOYED ANALOGICALLY
XXXV. THAT THE SEVERAL NAMES PREDICATED OF GOD ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS
XXXVI. HOW OUR INTELLECT FORMS A PROPOSITION ABOUT GOD
XXXVII. THAT GOD IS GOOD
XXXVIII. THAT GOD IS GOODNESS ITSELF
XXXIX. THAT NO EVIL CAN BE IN GOD
XL. THAT GOD IS THE GOOD OF EVERY GOOD
XLI. THAT GOD IS THE SOVEREIGN GOOD
XLII. THAT GOD IS ONE
XLIII. THAT GOD IS INFINITE
XLIV. THAT GOD IS AN INTELLIGENT BEING
XLV. THAT GOD'S ACT OF INTELLIGENCE IS HIS ESSENCE
XLVI. THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS BY NOTHING ELSE THAN HIS ESSENCE
XLVII. THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF PERFECTLY
XLVIII. THAT GOD KNOWS ONLY HIMSELF FIRST AND PER SE
XLIX. THAT GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF
L. THAT GOD HAS PROPER KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS
LI. REASONS FOR INQUIRING HOW THERE IS A MULTITUDE OF THINGS UNDERSTOOD IN THE …
LII. REASONS FOR INQUIRING HOW THERE IS A MULTITUDE OF THINGS UNDERSTOOD IN THE…
LIII. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING DOUBT
LIV. HOW THE DIVINE ESSENCE, THOUGH ONE AND SIMPLE, IS A PROPER LIKENESS OF ALL…
LV. THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS ALL THINGS AT THE SAME INSTANT
LVI. THAT GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT A HABIT
LVII. THAT GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT DISCURSIVE
LVIII. THAT GOD DOES NOT UNDERSTAND BY COMPOSITION AND DIVISION
LIX. THAT GOD IS NOT IGNORANT OF THE TRUTH OF ENUNCIATIONS
LX. THAT GOD IS TRUTH
LXI. THAT GOD IS THE MOST PURE TRUTH
LXII. THAT THE DIVINE TRUTH IS THE FIRST AND SUPREME TRUTH
LXIII. THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD DENY TO GOD THE KNOWLEDGE OF SINGULARS
LXIV. ORDER OF THE THINGS TO BE SAID ABOUT THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE
LXV. THAT GOD KNOWS SINGULARS
LXVI. THAT GOD KNOWS THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT
LXVII. THAT GOD KNOWS FUTURE CONTINGENT SINGULARS
LXVIII. THAT GOD KNOWS THE MOVEMENTS OF THE WILL
LXIX. THAT GOD KNOWS INFINITE THINGS
LXX. THAT GOD KNOWS TRIVIAL THINGS
LXXI. THAT GOD KNOWS EVIL THINGS
LXXII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS WILL
LXXIII. THAT GOD'S WILL IS HIS ESSENCE
LXXIV. THAT THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF GOD'S WILL IS THE DIVINE ESSENCE
LXXV. THAT GOD IN WILLING HIMSELF WILLS ALSO OTHER THINGS
LXXVI. THAT GOD, BY THE ONE ACT OF HIS WILL, WILLS HIMSELF AND OTHER THINGS
LXXVII. THAT THE MULTITUDE OF THINGS WILLED IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE DIVINE…
LXXVIII. THAT THE DIVINE WILL EXTENDS TO PARTICULAR GOODS
LXXIX. THAT GOD WILLS EVEN THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT YET
LXXX. THAT GOD NECESSARILY WILLS HIS BEING AND HIS GOODNESS
LXXXI. THAT GOD DOES NOT NECESSARILY WILL OTHER THINGS THAN HIMSELF
LXXXII. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE STATEMENT THAT GOD WILLS NOT OF NECESSITY THINGS…
LXXXIII. THAT GOD WILLS SOMETHING OTHER THAN HIMSELF BY A NECESSITY OF SUPPOSIT…
LXXXIV. THAT GOD'S WILL IS NOT OF THINGS IMPOSSIBLE IN THEMSELVES
LXXXV. THAT THE DIVINE WILL DOES NOT REMOVE CONTINGENCY FROM THINGS, NOR IMPOSE…
LXXXVI. THAT A REASON OF THE DIVINE WILL CAN BE ASSIGNED
LXXXVII. THAT NOTHING CAN BE THE CAUSE OF THE DIVINE WILL
LXXXVIII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS FREE-WILL
LXXXIX. THAT THE PASSIONS OF THE APPETITE ARE NOT IN GOD
XC. THAT IN GOD ARE DELIGHT AND JOY, NOR ARE THEY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE DIVINE …
XCI. THAT IN GOD THERE IS LOVE
XCII. HOW VIRTUES ARE TO BE ASCRIBED TO GOD
XCIII. THAT IN GOD THERE ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES WHICH ARE ABOUT ACTIONS
XCIV. THAT THE CONTEMPLATIVE VIRTUES ARE IN GOD
XCV. THAT GOD CANNOT WILL EVIL
XCVI. THAT GOD HATES NOTHING, NOR CAN THE HATRED OF ANYTHING BE ASCRIBED TO HIM
XCVII. THAT GOD IS A LIVING BEING
XCVIII. THAT GOD IS HIS OWN LIFE
XCIX. THAT GOD'S LIFE IS ETERNAL
C. THAT GOD IS HAPPY
CI. THAT GOD IS HIS OWN HAPPINESS
CII. THAT GOD'S HAPPINESS IS PERFECT AND SINGULAR, SURPASSING ALL OTHER HAPPINE…