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Financial Crisis Inquiry Report

Here is the final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission into the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Two thorough Dissenting Statements accompany the final report. The report is a chronological compendium of the review of millions of pages of documents, the interviews of hundreds of leaders, CxOs, financial experts and academics, as well as common people, home- and business-owners who were also significantly affected by the financial meltdown. - Summary by Mario Pineda (32 hr 52 min)

Chapters

Preface

8:03

Conclusions of the Commission

38:05

Conclusions of the Commission, concluded

22:59

Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1

38:26

Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2

45:54

Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3

17:57

Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos

30:09

Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis

18:16

Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

20:26

Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance

12:11

Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives

25:53

Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities

19:24

Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management

12:00

Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash

12:11

Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance

13:26

Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth

8:47

Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization

17:04

Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending

6:19

Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil

5:33

Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators

19:20

Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force

19:39

Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium

18:12

Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny

4:42

Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lend…

12:52

Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position

4:02

Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our …

10:44

Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage"

5:45

Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6

1:18

Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity

10:21

Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan

32:56

Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws …

6:49

Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product

17:23

Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check

16:09

Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in th…

13:09

Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7

3:24

Ch. 8. The CDO Machine

7:50

Ch. 8. We Created the Investor

22:21

Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just D…

10:33

Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest

10:51

Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street

10:28

Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime

17:16

Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy

18:33

Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess

19:27

Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8

2:55

Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom"

15:00

Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments

22:31

Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory

24:27

Regulators: markets will always self-correct

14:56

Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance

11:08

Lehman: From Moving to Storage

7:47

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices

11:36

2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the cred…

12:30

Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the…

17:05

Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9

1:39

Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager"

9:52

Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question"

24:17

Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless"

18:04

AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks"

8:42

Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes"

12:28

Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?"

7:29

Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue"

23:34

Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10

2:20

Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market"

29:56

Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before"

8:04

Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending"

4:50

Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information"

10:10

Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?"

13:22

Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11

2:33

Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries

7:02

Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive

13:59

Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds

16:01

Rating Agencies

4:27

AIG: Well Bigger

7:39

Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12

0:56

Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro

2:06

Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors"

5:42

Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11"

8:29

Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells"

4:40

Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm"

4:04

Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose"

6:19

Commission conclusions on Chapter 13

1:39

Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro)

2:42

Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer"

11:50

Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention"

22:26

Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses"

32:30

Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working"

7:47

Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses"

9:16

Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14

1:15

Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro)

3:48

Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance"

4:06

Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical"

3:56

Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral"

9:15

Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors"

11:06

Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number"

4:42

Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole"

2:49

Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15

1:16

Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro)

2:38

Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared"

8:36

Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable"

5:16

Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position"

7:39

Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk"

7:12

Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey"

26:35

Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16

1:19

Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro)

3:28

Ch 17 "A good time to buy"

5:04

Ch 17 "The only game in town"

3:30

Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool"

6:38

Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse"

3:58

Ch 17 "It will increase confidence"

8:45

Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices"

6:22

Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between"

7:31

Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution"

3:37

Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade"

1:16

Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17

2:26

Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro)

4:37

Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded"

7:17

Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all"

3:38

Ch 18 "Spook the market"

11:07

Ch 18 "Imagination hat"

8:19

Ch 18 "Heads of family"

3:38

Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind"

3:20

Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty"

8:02

Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail"

3:48

Ch 18 "A calamity"

12:42

Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18

2:30

Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro)

5:14

Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious"

6:56

Ch 19 "Spillover effect"

10:50

Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant"

5:18

Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19

3:07

Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro)

7:45

Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones"

10:36

Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line"

13:07

Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt"

6:26

Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours"

4:16

Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell"

18:26

Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach"

18:03

Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient"

10:19

Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman"

11:15

Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding"

13:17

Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20

2:45

Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro)

4:17

Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping"

12:15

Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts"

9:54

Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving"

5:09

Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls"

8:06

Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier"

3:18

Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery"

6:39

Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard"

6:37

Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios"

5:39

Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving"

5:26

Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22

1:01

Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro

1:19

Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our ap…

7:09

Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of …

2:26

Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten es…

6:10

Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit…

8:30

Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housin…

8:35

Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning ba…

7:28

Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank b…

9:32

Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types …

13:52

Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock …

6:39

Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system…

3:50

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro

23:30

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary

7:41

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government poli…

15:59

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housi…

13:03

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rat…

4:20

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and …

7:58

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known …

17:17

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion

4:40

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million…

3:26

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million…

3:21

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million…

34:12

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…

9:00

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…

7:34

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…

35:58

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…

27:41

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…

28:32

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…

10:15

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…

5:10

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US govern…

22:13

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion

2:37